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CLEANING UP THE MESS, OR MESSING UP THE 
CLEANUP: DOES CERCLA'S JURISDICTIONAL BAR 
(SECTION 113(h» PROHIBIT CITIZEN SUITS 
BROUGHT UNDER RCRA 
Nathan H. Stearns* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As clean-up crews feed hazardous waste laden with PCBs and 
dioxin into an incinerator, the temperature inside the incinerator drops 
below 2800° C for a moment. As a result, dioxin, one of the four most 
toxic and carcinogenic chemicals known to humankind,! escapes from 
the smokestack to be dispersed into the surrounding community. An 
unsuspecting private citizen inhales the dioxin, and ten, twenty, or 
thirty years later, dies from cancer.2 
Yes, there are laws that govern the emission of dioxin from hazard-
ous waste incinerators, and, unfortunately, it was the government 
that allowed the dioxin to be emitted from the incinerator as part of 
a hazardous waste cleanup. Yes, a cleanup. It seems hard to fathom 
that a cleanup would actually create a worse harm than the one it was 
intended to remedy, but it can happen.3 
This Comment explores whether private citizens can bring a law-
suit to prevent a cleanup that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has approved pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) when the citi-
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 1994--1995. 
The author would like to extend thanks to Charlie Lord and Bill Shutkin for their help with this 
Comment. 
1 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THE PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT FROM WASTE 
INCINERATION 9 (1993). 
2 A discussion of causation is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a general discussion, see 
Government Accountability Project, supra note 1. 
3 See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994) (citizens group alleging dioxin 
emitted by burning of hazardous wastes at CERCLA clean-up site). 
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zens perceive that the cleanup activities might harm their health or 
the local environment. To protect public health and the environment 
from hazardous wastes, Congress has provided the EPA with a sub-
stantial array of tools which include CERCLA and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).4 Under RCRA, Congress 
has also conferred on private citizens a right of action to bring law-
suits to abate imminent and substantial endangerments to public 
health and the environment, and to bring lawsuits to enforce RCRNs 
hazardous waste handling performance standards.5 The language in 
RCRA and CERCLA that relates to the ability of private citizens to 
abate imminent and substantial dangers created by an EPA-approved 
hazardous waste cleanup, however, is ambiguous.6 Some courts have 
interpreted this ambiguous language to deny private citizens the 
right to protect themselves against improperly conducted, but EPA-
approved, hazardous waste cleanups.7 
This Comment explores why courts, in light of Congress's overall 
hazardous waste management scheme, should read the language in 
RCRNs citizen suit provision to allow private citizens to bring suits 
to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment due to an im-
properly conducted, but EPA-approved, hazardous waste cleanup. 
Section II explores the Congressional intent behind the nation's haz-
ardous waste management scheme,s as well as possible interpreta-
tions of RCRNs citizen suit provisions9 and CERCLNs jurisdictional 
4 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-{i999k (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). These are only two of the acts passed by 
Congress to address protection of public health and the environment from hazardous sub-
stances, but they are the two acts that are central to this Comment. Other important environ-
mental acts include the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C .. § 1251 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C .. 
§ 7401 et seq.), the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C .. § 2601 et seq.), and the Federal 
Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C § 136 et seq.). 
5 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). RCRA's "Citizens' suits" provision allows citizens to bring a suit 
that seeks to enforce RCRA's requirements (section (a)(l)(A», and to bring a suit that seeks to 
abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment (section 
(a)(l)(B». See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
6 The language referred to includes CERCLA § 9613(h) and RCRA §§ 6972(a)(1)(a) and 
(a)(l)(B). This language is ambiguous in that it lends itself to more than one possible outcome 
for actions brought under RCRA with regard to an improperly conducted, but EPA-approved, 
hazardous waste cleanup. Campare Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d 1212 with United States v. 
Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). 
7 See, e.g., Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d 1212 (interpreting CERCLA section 113(h) to 
preclude a citizen suit brought under RCRA). 
8 This Comment limits Congress's hazardous waste management scheme to a discussion of 
RCRA and CERCLA. 
9 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
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bar provision.10 In addition, Section II addresses the current split of 
opinion in the federal circuit courts regarding the interpretation of 
CERCL.A:s jurisdictional bar in RCRA citizen suits. 
Section III offers a brief example of how the removal of CERCL.A:s 
jurisdictional bar for RCRA citizen suits helps to achieve the goals 
behind Congress's hazardous waste management scheme. Section IV 
discusses why courts should not read CERCL.A:s jurisdictional bar 
provision to prohibit RCRA citizen suits, and suggests that courts 
should allow RCRA and CERCLA to work together to adequately 
address the nation's hazardous waste problem. Finally, this Comment 
concludes that an interpretation of RCRA and CERCLA that allows 
private citizens to bring law suits under RCRA, even in the face of 
an EPA-approved CERCLA cleanup, accords with Congress' overall 
hazardous waste management scheme. 
II. How IT WORKS: RCR.A:s CITIZEN SUITS AND CERCL.A:s 
JURISDICTIONAL BAR 
A. Congress's Hazardous Waste Management Scheme: RCRA and 
CERCLA 
Together, RCRA and CERCLA make up the bulk of Congress's 
hazardous waste management scheme. ll CERCL.A:s provisions ad-
dress the actual cleanup of released hazardous waste,12 and RCR.A:s 
provisions prescribe standards to ensure that the present handling of 
hazardous wastes will not result in the need for future cleanups.13 The 
language, structure, and legislative history of the two acts indicate 
Congress's intent that CERCLA clean-up standards and RCRA per-
formance standards work together to provide a hazardous waste man-
agement scheme to remedy the nation's hazardous waste problem.14 
10 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
11 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570, 1575-76 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) (declaring that Congress intended RCRA and CERCLA to work together 
to address the nation's problem of hazardous waste management). Other acts also address 
hazardous waste control. See supra note 4. RCRA and CERCLA, however, are the two acts 
that are most relevant to this Comment. 
12 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d). This section specifies the degree of cleanup that CERCLA 
remedial actions must achieve; a degree "which assures protection of human health and the 
environment." Id. 
13 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5). This section calls for proper management of hazardous 
wastes to minimize the need for future cleanups. Id. 
14 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924 (setting forth the provisions that govern the EPA's 
promulgation of hazardous waste handling performance standards to apply to generators, 
transporters, and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities of hazard-
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In 1976, Congress enacted RCRA to address the nation's hazardous 
waste problem.15 Congress intended RCRA to "promote the protec-
tion of health and the environment,"16 by "requiring that hazardous 
waste be properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the 
need for corrective action at a future date."17 RCRA requires the EPA 
to adopt performance standards for the safe handling and disposal of 
hazardous waste.IS RCRA requires the EPA to design these perform-
ance standards "to protect human health and the environment."19 The 
EPA enforces RCRA's performance standards in part by requiring all 
facilities that store, treat and dispose of hazardous waste to obtain 
and comply with permits issued by the EPA.20 Because RCRA com-
pels handlers of hazardous wastes to manage their wastes in a way 
that eliminates risk of future harm to public health and the environ-
ment, RCRA is known as Congress's prospective tool for addressing 
the nation's hazardous waste problem.21 RCRA, however, only applies 
prospectively to the management of hazardous waste facilities that 
are in operation.22 
In 1980, Congress recognized that this prospective only approach 
left much previously released hazardous waste unaddressed.23 As a 
ous wastes); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (setting forth CERCLA's savings provision preserv-
ing the effects of all other laws including RCRA); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1)(B) (requiring 
that remedial actions chosen under CERCLA take into consideration RCRA's requirements); 
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119 
(stating that purpose of enacting CERCLA was to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act, also 
known as RCRA, to ensure that the nation had laws that would adequately address the dangers 
posed to human health and the environment from hazardous wastes. See also United States v. 
Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1570, 1575-76 (recognizing that Congress intended CERCLA to work in 
conjunction with other hazardous waste laws, including RCRA, to address the nation's hazard-
ous waste problem). 
15 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b). 
16 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). 
17 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5). 
18 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a). 
19 [d. 
20 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925. 
21 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5) (calling for proper management of hazardous wastes now 
to avoid the need for cleanups in the future); H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 17 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (recognizing that RCRA only deals prospectively 
with the problem of hazardous waste). See also United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570 
(loth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) (recognizing RCRA applies prospectively). 
22 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924; H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. 
23 The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce recognized this shortcoming of RCRA, 
and recommended the passage of CERCLA to address the problem of previously released 
hazardous wastes. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21 at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6120. 
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result, Congress enacted CERCLA to address dangers to public health 
and the environment associated with past releases of hazardous wastes.24 
By enacting CERCLA to cover past releases of hazardous wastes, 
Congress intended to fill the gaps in the nation's hazardous waste 
management scheme left open in RCRA.25 
The EPA enforces CERCLA in a different way than it enforces 
RCRNs permitting program.26 Congress designed CERCLNs provi-
sions to alleviate dangers to public health and the environment by 
authorizing the EPA to pursue cleanups of released hazardous wastes.27 
CERCLA imposes joint and several liability on responsible parties 
for the costs of cleaning up released hazardous wastes.28 Section 104 
of CERCLA authorizes the EPA to pursue clean-up activities by 
borrowing money from a central Superfund to cover the costs of the 
cleanup, and then seeking reimbursement from responsible parties.29 
Under section 104, the EPA may pursue short-term remedies, known 
as removal actions,30 or permanent remedies, known as remedial ac-
tions.31 The EPA also has the authority, under section 106, to issue an 
24 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. 
25 See id. 
26 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (setting forth methods of enforcement for CERCLA's 
requirements); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
'Z1 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606; H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, 
rlf[Jrinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-.Q120 (indicating Congress's intent behind its enactment 
of CERCLA was to protect public health and the environment from hazardous waste). 
A preliminary step in a CERCLA cleanup is the formulation of a response plan. Before the 
EPA, or any other person, undertakes a response plan, CERCLA requires that there be an 
opportunity for public participation in the formulation of a CERCLA response plan. CERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. § 9617. Congress intended this public participation requirement to ensure that af-
fected communities supported response actions. See Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review and 
CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 48 n.234 (1993). The public participation requirement also ensures that the 
EPA considers all alternative response plans in the hope that the chosen response plan will not 
harm human health and the environment. See id. The consideration of alternatives includes the 
alternative of leaving the hazardous wastes in place and doing nothing. See CERCLA, § 9621(a)-
(c). There are arguably cases in which the "do nothing" alternative may be safer than removing 
the hazardous wastes. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs. Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 
1981) (discussed in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENvmoNMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NA-
TURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 68-76) (describing case where court ordered removal of hazardous 
wastes, which removal ruptured waste containers and involved transportation of wastes 
through nearby residential community creating potential for accident and increased exposure 
of residents to hazardous wastes). 
28 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
29 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
30 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9621(d), 9601(23). 
31 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9621(d), 9601(24). 
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administrative order that requires responsible parties to undertake a 
private cleanup of released hazardous waste.32 
Although RCRA and CERCLA function differently, the legislative 
histories of the acts indicate that RCRA and CERCLA are both part 
of the same legislative scheme.33 Congress's primary goal in enacting 
both RCRA and CERCLA was the same-to protect public health 
and the environment from dangers posed by hazardous wastes.34 More-
over, Congress intended CERCLA to fill gaps in the same legislative 
scheme that contained RCRA.35 In fact, Congress originally enacted 
CERCLA as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which 
is better known today as RCRA.36 Thus, CERCLA is effectively 
an amendment of RCRA.37 Even though RCRA and CERCLA are 
printed in different sections of the United States Code, they are 
ultimately part of the same legislative scheme that Congress enacted 
to remedy the nation's hazardous waste problem.38 
Not only do the legislative histories of RCRA and CERCLA indi-
cate that Congress intended RCRA and CERCLA to be part of the 
same legislative scheme, but the structure of the two acts also indi-
cates that Congress intended RCRA and CERCLA to work together.39 
While CERCLA provides standards that address how clean a hazard-
32CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. 
33 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119 
(legislative history of CERCLA recognizing that CERCLA was an amendment to the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, also known today as RCRA); H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5577 (recognizing RCRA was originally an amend-
ment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act). 
34 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119; H.R. 
REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6239-6241. 
35 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119-6120; United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993), em. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 922 (1994) (recognizing that Congress enacted CERCLA to augment RCRA). 
36 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119-6120; H.R. REP. No. 198, supra note 33, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5576. 
Furthermore, one of the canons of statutory construction is that, generally, prior enacted 
statutes are not repealed by implication when Congress passes a more recent statute. See, e.g., 
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575 (reviewing judicial rules of statutory interpretation). 
Thus, a court should not find that CERCLA, which Congress enacted in 1980 and amended in 
1986, implicitly repealed any provisions of RCRA, which was enacted in 1976 and amended in 
1984, absent statutory language to the contrary. See id. 
37 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119. 
38 See id. (indicating that Congress enacted CERCLA as part of a plan to protect public health 
and the environment from hazardous wastes); H.R. REP. No. 198, supra note 33, at 18, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5576 (indicating that Congress enacted RCRA as part of a plan to 
protect public health and the environment from hazardous wastes) 
39 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6928 (setting forth provision relating to performance stand-
ards for hazardous waste control); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614 (a) (preserving effect of state 
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ous waste site should be, CERCLA does not attempt to identify 
performance standards applicable to the actual clean-up process.40 
Because CERCLA and RCRA were originally part of the same act, 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, it is only logical that one should look 
for clean-up performance standards in that act. RCRA is the part of 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act that contains performance standards 
that apply to all handling and disposal of hazardous wastes.41 
The plain language of both acts also indicates Congress's intent that 
RCRA's standards should apply to CERCLA cleanups.42 RCRA's "In-
tegration with other Acts" provision states that "[t]he Administrator 
shall integrate all provisions of this chapter ... [with] such other Acts 
of Congress as grant regulatory authority to the Administrator."43 
Similarly, CERCLA's "General Rules" provision requires the EPA to 
consider "the goals, objectives, and requirements of [RCRA]" when 
the EPA considers alternative remedial actions for response plans.44 
Moreover, while CERCLA specifically exempts clean-up activities 
from the RCRA permitting process, CERCLA does not exempt clean-
up activities from complying with RCRA's performance standards.45 
Finally, CERCLA's "savings provision" states that "[n]othing in this 
chapter shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities 
of any person under other Federal or State law."46 
CERCLA is Congress's retrospective tool for securing cleanup of 
released hazardous waste.47 RCRA is Congress's prospective tool for 
hazardous waste laws), 9621(b)(1)(B) (requiring consideration of the "goals, objectives, and 
requirements" of RCRA in choosing a clean-up plan under CERCLA). 
40 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1)(B) (requiring consideration of RCRA's requirements 
in CERCLA cleanups); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (specifying that CERCLA cleanups shall 
be performed to a degree of cleanliness that protects public health and the environment). 
41 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b) (requiring that the EPA integrate the requirements of 
RCRA with other acts to the extent that such integration comports with the goals of other 
acts). Protection of public health and the environment from hazardous wastes is a goal of both 
RCRA and CERCLA. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119...Q120 (declaring purpose of CERCLA to be protection of public health and 
the environment); H.R. Rep. No. 198, supra note 33, at 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5576 (declaring purpose of RCRA to be protection of public health and the environment). 
42 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9652(d), 9605(b), 9621(a). 
43 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6005(b). CERCLA is one of the acts to which RCRA applies, because 
CERCLA grants the EPA authority to regulate the cleanup of hazardous wastes. See supra 
notes 26-32 and accompanying text. 
44 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1)(B). 
45 See id. (requiring consideration of RCRA's requirements in formulating a response plan 
under CERCLA). 
46 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). If parties are obligated to comply with RCRA, CERCLA's 
savings provision, arguably, does not modify that obligation absent specific statutory language 
to the contrary. 
47 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
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ensuring that the cleanup itself does not endanger public health or 
the environment.48 Thus, together, CERCLA and RCRA make up 
Congress's national hazardous waste management scheme. 
1. Citizen Suit Provisions 
Both RCRA and CERCLA incorporate citizen suit provisions that 
enable private parties to bring actions to enforce the requirements of 
each act.49 Congress included the citizen suit provisions in RCRA and 
CERCLA to aid the EPA in the goal of ensuring that the nation 
manages and cleans up hazardous wastes to avoid harm to public 
health and the environment.50 Congress, however, has limited the 
ability of private parties to enforce the requirements of both RCRA 
and CERCLA by including a jurisdictional bar provision in both acts 
which, in general, prohibits citizen suits when the EPA's actions ad-
dress the hazardous waste problem that the citizen suit seeks to 
address.51 
a. CERCLA's Citizen Suit Jurisdictional Bar: Section 113(h) 
CERCLA's citizen suit provision allows private parties to bring an 
action to enforce CERCLA against the government or private par-
ties.52 Such an action is barred, however, if the EPA is already pursu-
ing a cleanup at the hazardous waste release site that the action seeks 
to address.53 Congress enacted CERCLA's jurisdictional bar, section 
48 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
49 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(l)(A). 
50 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 303-04. Citizen suit provisions reflect Congress's 
recognition that EPA's resources and political motivations may be insufficient to address the 
nation's hazardous waste problem. See id. This is partly because of the magnitude of the problem 
and partly because of the "iron triangle" phenomenon whereby the EPA chooses not to pursue 
enforcement because of political motivations. See id.; United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 
1573 (10th Cir.1993), een. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) (declaring EPA's supervision of CERCLA 
cleanup conducted by the United States Army suspicious because of relationship between the 
EPA and the Army-two government organizations). The grant of power to citizens to enforce 
statutory requirements helps ensure that someone will enforce statutes even if the EPA does 
not get around to it. See PLATER ET AL, supra note 27, at 303-04. 
51 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
52 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. By allowing private citizens to enforce CERCLA, Congress 
furthered its goal of addressing the nation's hazardous waste problem without having to rely 
solely on the EPA's limited resources. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 303--D4. 
53 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). This section states that "[sluch an action may not be 
brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site." [d. 
Courts have interpreted this language to mean that citizen suits may not be brought until the 
remedial action is completed. See, e.g., Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 
F. Supp. 828, 833 (D.N.J. 1989). 
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113(h), to prevent citizen suits from delaying CERCLA cleanups54 and 
to avoid the expenditure of Superfund money on copious litigation.55 
There is evidence in CERCLNs legislative history, however, that 
indicates Congress did not intend to deny courts the ability to review 
citizen suits related to "legitimate" health concerns prior to the com-
pletion of a CERCLA cleanup.56 
Under CERCLNs citizen suit provision, private parties may bring 
an action "against any person ... alleged to be in violation of any 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has be-
come effective pursuant to this chapter."57 If the plaintiff's claim suc-
ceeds, the court is authorized to order "such action as may be neces-
sary to correct the violation."58 Nevertheless, the same provision which 
grants the authority for citizen suits also limits citizens' ability to 
bring such an action by stating that actions may be brought "[e]xcept 
as provided ... in section [113(h)] of this title."59 
Section 113(h) of CERCLA provides that, 
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other 
than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citi-
zenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or 
relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating 
to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to removal or 
remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to 
review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any 
action except one of the following: 
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens 
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under 
54 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2835, 2941. The report states that, "[t]he purpose of [this] amendment is to prevent private 
responsible parties from filing dilatory, interim lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down 
or preventing EPA's cleanup activities." [d. 
50 See 132 CONGo REC. S14928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Thurmond). Senator 
Thurmond stated a belief that ''the timing of review section ensures that Government and 
private cleanup resources will be directed toward mitigation, not litigation." [d. 
56 See 132 CONGo REC. H9575, H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Representative 
Florio). Mr. Florio stated that "[section 113(h)] intends that the courts will draw appropriate 
distinctions between dilatory lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving only mone-
tary damages and legitimate citizens' suits representing irreparable injury that can only be 
addressed during the course of implementing cleanup." [d.; see also 132 CONGo REC. SI4818, 
SI4898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senators Stafford and Mitchell) (expressing belief in 
line with those expressed by Representative Florio above). But see 132 CONGo REC. S14929 
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Thurmond) (expressing opinions opposite to those 
expressed by Representative Florio above). 
57 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(I). 
58 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c). 
59 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a). 
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section 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title 
was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action 
may not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial 
action is to be undertaken at the site.60 
Thus, in other words, once the EPA has chosen a response action 
under CERCLA section 104 or CERCLA section 106, CERCLA sec-
tion 113(h) bars judicial review of any substantive challenge to the 
response action, except for challenges by private citizens.61 Because 
CERCLA section 113(h)(4) employs the past tense, however, courts 
have interpreted this section to postpone review of citizen suits until 
the "challenged" cleanup has been completed.62 
It is important to understand that the Congressional purpose be-
hind CERCLA section 113(h) was to prevent responsible parties from 
delaying cleanups; its purpose was not to eliminate all possibility of 
judicial review for parties with "legitimate" claims63 involving a CER-
CLA cleanup.64 The plain language of CERCLA section 113(h) does 
60 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
61 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The right of private citizens to bring an action is preserved 
under § 9613(h)(4). CERCLA § 9613(h)(4). Although § 9613(b)(1-3) and (5) preserve other 
causes of action, subdivisions (2),(3), and (5) all relate to the ability of the government to bring 
an action, CERCLA § 9613(b)(2),(3),(5), and subdivision (1) relates solely to monetary issues 
involved in a cleanup. CERCLA § 9613(h). Subdivision (4) is the only subdivision that preserves 
a cause of action to challenge the substance of a CERCLA cleanup. CERCLA § 9613(b)(4). 
62See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h); North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990); Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup 
Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 834 (D.N.J. 1989). 
63 The word "legitimate" is used here to refer to claims that are prima facie valid and that 
represent legitimate grievances with a CERCLA cleanup-not suits that are intended merely 
to delay a CERCLA cleanup. See 132 CONGo REC. H9575, H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks 
of Representative Florio) (referring to these types of lawsuits as "legitimate citizens' suits"). 
64 See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941; see 
also United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1576 (10th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 
(1994). 
The legislative history states of CERCLA section 113(h) states that, 
The purpose of the Tauke-Richardson amendment [section 113(h)] is to prevent private 
responsible parties from filing dilatory, interim lawsuits which have the effect of 
slowing down or preventing EPA's cleanup activities. By limiting court challenges to 
the point in time when the agency has decided to enforce the liability of such private 
responsible parties, the amendment will ensure both that effective cleanup is not 
derailed and that private responsible parties get their full day in court to challenge the 
agency's determination that they are liable for cleanup costs. 
See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941. Arguably, 
for a lawsuit that sought to abate a harm created by clean-up activities, postponement of the 
lawsuit until completion of the cleanup would render the suit moot. See North Shore Gas, 930 
F.2d at 1245 (expressing concern that courts could read CERCLA section 113(h) to bar lawsuits 
and effectively render lawsuits moot). 
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not take away the right to pursue "legitimate" claims, even though it 
may postpone such a right.65 Nor does CERCLA section 113(h) affect 
the right to pursue a claim under diversity jurisdiction or under state 
law.66 The Committee of Conference confirmed that Congress did not 
intend CERCLA section 113(h) to take away the right to pursue 
"legitimate" claims.67 The Committee stated that CERCLA section 
113(h) "is not intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to 
bring nuisance actions under State law with respect to releases [of 
hazardous wastes]."68 
Section 113(h)(4) does preserve the right of private citizens to bring 
a suit challenging an EPA-approved CERCLA cleanup, but section 
113(h)(4) postpones that right until the cleanup is completed.69 By 
delaying review of citizen suits that involve CERCLA response ac-
tions until completion of such response actions, responsible parties 
retain the ability to challenge the EPA's assessment of liability for 
clean-up costs upon completion of the cleanup, and litigation does not 
unnecessarily delay cleanups.7o In addition, by allowing claims under 
state law, CERCLA section 113(h)'s preservation of the right to pur-
sue state law claims ensures that CERCLA cleanups will comply with 
any relevant state laws that govern performance standards for haz-
ardous waste handling.71 
The declared purpose behind CERCLA section 113(h), ensuring 
that cleanups are not delayed by "dilatory, interim lawsuits" brought 
by responsible parties in an attempt to slow down or prevent EPA's 
clean-up activities, comports with the overall goal of Congress's haz-
ardous waste management scheme.72 A prompt response action helps 
65 See CERCLA, 42 U .S.C. § 9613(h). The language of this section merely states that a lawsuit 
may not be maintained until response actions have been completed. [d. The section does not 
state that parties may never bring a citizen suit to challenge the EP.Ns decisions regarding a 
CERCLA cleanup. See id. 
66 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). This section specifically reserves party's rights to pursue 
an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction, and under "State law which is applicable 
or relevant and appropriate." [d. 
67 H.R. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 
3317. 
68 [d. 
69 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4); H.R. REP. No. 962, supra note 67, at 224, reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3317. 
70 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4) 
71 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(h)(4), 9659. Most state laws which govern hazardous waste 
management standards are authorized by the EPA pursuant to RCRA. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6991(d). 
72 The overall goal of Congress's hazardous waste management scheme is to protect public 
health and the environment. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 
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to minimize the risk of harm to public health and the environment by 
reducing exposure to the hazardous wastes.73 Thus, such an interpre-
tation of CERCLA section 113(h) to postpone review until completion 
of a CERCLA cleanup would serve to further the primary goal of 
Congress's hazardous waste management scheme, protection of public 
health and the environment.74 
It is possible that in some circumstances the goal of ensuring prompt 
cleanup would not be compatible with Congress's goal of protecting 
public health and the environment.75 An examination of CERCLA 
section 113(h)'s legislative history indicates that Congress desired 
courts to differentiate between suits brought by responsible parties 
seeking to delay or prevent a CERCLA cleanup, and "legitimate" 
citizen suits seeking to address concerns related to endangerment of 
public health and the environment.76 
Citizen suits that allege that a clean-up action itself may be creating 
a hazard to health or the environment can become moot if courts delay 
review until the response action is completed.77 By the time the court 
heard the claim, the harm from the cleanup would already be done.78 
The possibility that courts might read CERCLA section 113(h) in a 
way that would have such a confounding result lead some members 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-6120 (indicating Congressional intent to protect public health and the 
environment through cleaning up hazardous wastes). 
73 See Cabot Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D.Pa. 
1988) (recognizing relationship between CERCLA section 113(h)'s goal of prompt cleanups and 
Congress's goal of protection of public health and the environment from hazardous wastes). 
74 H.R. REP No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119--6120; 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b)(4), (5). 
75 See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1213-14 (8th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994) (citizens group alleging cleanup 
employing incineration to destroy toxic wastes was emitting dioxin into the air and harming 
local residents); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) (state bringing action under RCRA's citizen suit provision to enforce 
performance standards to ensure that Army's CERCLA cleanup complied with relevant law). 
In each of these situations, prohibition of the relevant lawsuit would have meant that the 
CERCLA cleanups proceeded even if they were improperly conducted or if they harmed the 
public health and the environment of the surrounding community. 
76 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
The reader may be tempted to draw an analogy between "legitimate" citizen suits and 
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) suits. This may be an apt analogy, but the real concern of such 
a RCRA lawsuit might be closer to "do not violate the hazardous waste laws in my back yard." 
77 See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th 
Cir. 1991); Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829. 
78 If a cleanup is creating a harm and is allowed to continue without interruption until 
completion, another cleanup will be necessary to remedy the harm created by the first cleanup. 
This is not only contrary to the prospective goals of RCRA, but also to the goals of Congress's 
hazardous waste management scheme, protecting public health and the environment. 
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of Congress to urge courts to consider the equities of the situation in 
the court's decision of whether to delay review of a citizen suit under 
CERCLA section 113(h)(4).79 These members of Congress desired to 
avoid an elimination of judicial review for "legitimate" citizen suits 
that could lead to irreparable harm by postponing review until the 
harm was done.80 
The legislative history of CERCLA section 113(h) supports a con-
clusion that while suits brought by responsible parties often seek to 
avoid liability by preventing the EPA from pursuing a response ac-
tion, "legitimate" citizen suits usually allege that the chosen response 
action will create more of a risk to human health or the environment 
than an alternative response.8! During legislative debates on CER-
CLA section 113(h) several members of Congress recognized this 
potential problem and encouraged courts to make the distinction be-
tween suits by responsible parties and "legitimate" citizen suits.82 
Senator Stafford stressed that "legitimate" citizen suits usually allege 
"that the President or other official have violated the cleanup stand-
ards or other requirements of the law, and that public health or the 
environment would be threatened if the proposed action were under-
taken."83 Similarly, Representative Roe stated that "[t]he legislation 
intends that the courts will draw appropriate distinctions between 
dilatory lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving only 
monetary damages and legitimate citizen suits representing irrepara-
ble injury that can only be addressed during the course of implement-
ing a cleanup."84 In addition, Senator Mitchell noted that 
Citizens are suing to compel compliance with cleanup standards 
that are designed to protect the public health. Responsible par-
ties, on the other hand, may be suing to halt cleanup because of 
concerns that the response action is too costly .... [C]ourts should 
carefully weigh the equities and give great weight to the public 
health risks involved.BE 
79 See supra note 56. 
80 See supra note 56. 
81 See supra note 56. 
82 See supra note 56. 
&'! 132 CONGo REC. 814898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). 
84 132 CONGo REC. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). 
85 132 CONGo REC. 814818 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986); see 132 CONGo REC. H9575 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 
1986) (Representative Florio stressing the importance of being able to bring citizen suits 
"alleging violations of law and irreparable injury to health" as soon as any part of a CERCLA 
response action was completed); 132 CONGo REC. 814898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (8enator 8tafford 
stating that "[ilt is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response 
actions, or final cleanup plans before such plans are implemented even in part."). 
~ ----~~--~~-- --------------------------
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Thus, some members of Congress did not want CERCLA section 
113(h) to achieve prompt clean-up actions at the expense of protecting 
public health and the environment. 
It should be noted that other members of Congress did not believe 
there should be any distinction between citizen suits by responsible 
parties and "legitimate" citizen suits concerned with irreparable harm 
to public health or the environment.86 Senator Thurmond expressed 
a belief that "[t]he timing of review section is intended to be compre-
hensive .... [I]t covers all issues that could be construed as a chal-
lenge to the response, and limits those challenges to the opportunities 
specifically set forth in the section."87 
To a limited extent, courts have noted the distinction between 
responsible party suits and "legitimate" citizen suits.88 In North Shore 
Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, responsible parties 
challenged part of a CERCLA response plan that required the re-
sponsible parties to construct a boat slip as part of a clean-up action.89 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the case as 
barred under CERCLA section 113(h)(4).90 In so doing, however, the 
court evinced its concern that a court could read CERCLA section 
113(h) in a way that eliminated all possibility of judicial review for 
certain citizen suits.91 The Seventh Circuit expressed concern that 
such an interpretation of CERCLA section 113(h) could result in 
irreparable harm by prohibiting review of "legitimate" claims.92 
Similarly, in Cabot Corp. v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania dismissed a suit brought by responsible parties challenging the 
authority of the EPA to order a cleanup at a hazardous waste release 
site.93 The court dismissed the case as barred under CERCLA section 
113(h)(4), but reached its decision by distinguishing between suits by 
responsible parties and "legitimate" citizen suits.94 The court stated 
that citizen suits alleging that a clean-up action "posed a risk of 
irreparable harm to health or the environment" would be eligible for 
86 See 132 CONGo REC. S14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Thurmond). 
87 ld. 
88 See North Shore Gas CO. V. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245, (7th Cir. 
1991); Cabot Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823, 827-29 (E.D.Pa. 
1988). 
89 North Share Gas, 930 F.2d at 1241. 
90 See id. 
9! See id. 
92 See id. at 1245. 
93 Cabot Corp. V. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823, 824 (E.D.Pa.1988). 
94 See id. at 827-29. 
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review sooner than if the suit alleged essentially liability issues.95 The 
court reached this distinction based upon CERCLA's legislative his-
tory which called for courts to draw such a distinction in order to 
serve the purposes behind CERCLA.96 
Congress enacted CERCLA section 113(h) to prevent unnecessary 
delay of CERCLA cleanups due to citizen litigation.97 For a court to 
read CERCLA section 113(h) to postpone review of citizens suits until 
completion of a CERCLA cleanup serves the overall goal of Con-
gress's hazardous waste management scheme, because it prevents 
clean-up delays and thereby reduces exposure to the released hazard-
ous wastes.98 The same reading can also have the opposite effect, 
because the delay of "legitimate" citizen suits can lead to irreparable 
harm to public health and the environment.99 Some courts have noted 
remarks from CERCLA section 113(h)'s legislative history and have 
read section 113(h) in a way that gives greater weight to Congress's 
goal of protecting public health and the environment than to its goal 
of ensuring prompt cleanups.lOo 
b. RCRA's Citizens'Suit and Its Jurisdictional Bar 
RCRA's citizen suit provision provides its own version of CER-
CLA's jurisdictional bar.101 This jurisdictional bar changes, however, 
depending on whether a party brings a suit under RCRA's enforce-
ment provision, section (a)(l)(A),I02 or under RCRA's imminent and 
substantial endangerment provision, section (a)(l)(B).l03 Section 
95 See id. at 829. The court expressed this concern by stating that citizen suits alleging 
irreparable harm to health or the environment should come under the provisions of section 
113(h)(4) and that liability claims should wait for review under section 113(h)(1). See id. How-
ever, the court also believed that review under section 113(h)(4) would be available as soon as 
the EPA approved a response plan, and before the plan was actually implemented. See id. at 
828. Other courts have not followed this view that review under CERCLA section 113(h)(4) is 
available as soon as the EPA approves a response plan. See, e.g., Neighborhood 'lbxic Cleanup 
Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 832-'34 (D.N.J. 1989). These courts have held that no 
review is available under CERCLA section 113(h)(4) until completion of the relevant response 
action. See, e.g., id. 
96 See Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829-'30; see also supra notes 56 and 80-S2 and accompanying 
text. 
97 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941. 
98 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 
(7th Cir. 1991); Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 829. 
101 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 
102 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). 
103 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
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(a)(l)(A) of RCRA allows a private party to bring a suit to compel 
compliance with the requirements of RCRA's provisions, unless the 
EPA is already pursuing its own enforcement action.104 Section (a)(l)(B) 
of RCRA allows private parties to bring actions to restrain or abate 
acts which the parties allege are creating "an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment," unless the EPA is 
already seeking to restrain or abate the alleged endangerment.105 
The language and structure of RCRA's citizen suit provision indi-
cate that Congress intended that parties could bring RCRA (a)(1)(A) 
actions to enforce the requirements of RCRA's provisions at a CER-
CLA cleanupy16 RCRA's jurisdictional bar, for both RCRA (a)(l)(A) 
and RCRA (a)(l)(B) actions, is contained in RCRA section 6972(b).107 
The language of RCRA section 6972(b) prohibits a citizen suit under 
RCRA (a)(l)(A) if the government is already pursuing an action to 
enforce the same requirements that the citizen suit seeks to addressYl8 
The language in section 6972(b) that establishes the jurisdictional bar 
for RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions, however, prohibits such actions if the 
104 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). This section provides that, 
[d. 
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence 
a civil action on his own behalf against any person (including (a) the United States, and 
(b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the 
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any 
permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has 
become effective pursuant to this chapter. 
105 RCRA, § 42 U.S.C. 6972 (a)(1)(B). The statute provides that, 
[d. 
(a) except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(B) against any person, including the United States, and any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, 
or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who 
has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 
106 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
HI7 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 
100 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B). 
(b) Actions prohibited 
[d. 
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section-
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil 
or criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with 
such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order. 
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EPA is pursuing an action to address the activities109 which are creat-
ing the alleged endangerment, including a response under CERCLA.1l0 
In other words, section 6972(b) bars a citizen suit under RCRA (a)(1)(B) 
in the face of an ongoing, EPA-approved cleanup,lll but there is no 
corresponding bar for suits brought under RCRA (a)(1)(A) during 
an EPA-approved cleanup.ll2 The prohibition of citizen suits under 
RCRA (a)(1)(B) where a CERCLA response is ongoing, and lack of 
corresponding prohibition for citizen suits under RCRA (a)(1)(A), 
indicates Congress's intent that a CERCLA response would not bar 
an enforcement action under RCRA's (a)(1)(A) provision.ll3 Thus, par-
ties may bring a citizen suit under RCRA (a)(1)(A) to compel compli-
ance with the requirements of RCRA, even in the face of a CERCLA 
cleanup. 
This reading of RCRA comports with views expressed in CER-
CLA's legislative history that RCRA and CERCLA would work to-
gether in remedying the nation's hazardous waste problemY4 When 
Congress composed RCRA's citizen suit provision to allow enforce-
ment of RCRA's performance standards at a CERCLA clean-up site, 
109 "The activities" is emphasized here to point out that the subject matter of the EPA's action 
must coincide with the subject matter of the citizen suit. See infra notes 123-25 and accompa-
nying text. 
110 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) provides that, 
(2)(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section if the 
Administrator, in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have contrib-
uted or are contributing to the activities which may present the alleged endanger-
ment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under section 6973 of this 
title or under section 106 of [CERCLA]; 
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of [CERCLA]; 
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
under section 104 of [CERCLA] 
(iv) has obtained a court order (including a consent decree) or issued an administra-
tive order under section 106 of [CERCLA] or section 6973 of this title pursuant to 
which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal action, Remedial Investi-
gation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or proceeding with a remedial action. 
In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause (iv), action under subsec-
tion (a)(l)(B) of this section are prohibited only as to the scope and duration of the 
administrative order referred to in clause (iv). 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
111 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 
112 [d. 
113 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
922 (1994) (exploring absence of corresponding prohibition for RCRA (a)(l)(A) actions in the 
face of a CERCLA response). 
114 See supra notes 33--38 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 
at 1575 (reading RCRA in a manner to allow it to work with CERCLA to remedy the nation's 
hazardous waste problem). 
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Congress gave further effect to RCRA's objective "that hazardous 
waste be properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the 
need for corrective action at a future date."115 Congress's application 
of RCRA's requirements to CERCLA cleanups ensures that parties 
conduct cleanups in a "safe" manner that eliminates the need to ad-
dress future damage to public health and the environment which 
could result from an improperly conducted cleanup.n6 The ability to 
maintain an action under RCRA (a)(1)(A) comports with the relation-
ship between RCRA and CERCLA in Congress's hazardous waste 
management scheme.l17 Moreover, the ability to maintain a RCRA 
(a)(1)(A) action comports with the fact that CERCLA does not ex-
empt itself from RCRA's performance standards.u8 
Where parties bring a citizen suit under RCRA's (a)(l)(B) provision, 
to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health 
or the environment, RCRA section (b)(2)(B) prohibits the lawsuit if 
the EPA is already pursuing an action to abate the acts which are 
allegedly creating or contributing to the endangerment to health or 
environment.n9 The language of RCRA (b)(2)(B) provides that an 
action under RCRA (a)(l)(B) is prohibited if the EPA is acting "in 
order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have contrib-
uted or are contributing to the activities which may present the 
alleged endangerment."12o Arguably, one can read RCRA (b)(2)(B) to 
restrict the jurisdictional bar on RCRA (a)(l)(B) suits only to situ-
ations where the EPA is addressing the exact same activities which 
the parties allege to be creating the endangerment to public health or 
the environment.121 In other words, if the EPA participates in an 
action to clean up a release of hazardous waste that parties allege to 
be an endangerment, a party may not bring a citizen suit that chal-
lenges the cleanup of those wastes until completion of the cleanup.122 
On the other hand, where the alleged endangerment is not the re-
leased hazardous waste that is subject to the cleanup, but is instead 
the emissions from clean-up activities, one may read the language of 
115 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5). 
116 The elimination of future hazardous waste problems is a goal of RCRA. See RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5). 
117 See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text. 
lIB See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(1). This section specifically requires that RCRA's re-
quirements must be considered in the determination of the appropriate response action at a 
CERCLA site. See id. 
119 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
100 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
121 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
122 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
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RCRA (a)(1)(B) and RCRA (b)(2)(B) to indicate that a citizen suit is 
not barred unless the EPA is involved in an action that addresses the 
allegedly dangerous emissions.123 
It is possible that the clean-up activities themselves may create 
an endangerment distinct from the endangerment of the hazardous 
wastes that are being cleaned Up.l24 In such a situation, a party might 
maintain an action under RCRA (a)(1)(B) if the EPA was not taking 
corrective action relating to the pollution emitted by the clean-up 
activities.125 For a court to allow an action under RCRA (a)(1)(B) 
would further the purpose of RCRA to provide for the safe disposal 
of hazardous wastes in the first place so as to eliminate the need for 
future remedial action.126 Moreover, for a court to allow such an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment action would further the primary 
goal of Congress's hazardous waste management scheme, protecting 
public health and the environment.I27 On the other hand, it is possible 
that Congress intended RCRA (b)(2)(B) to bar all RCRA (a)(1)(B) 
actions in order to prevent litigation from delaying clean-up actions.l28 
The intent to bar all RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions does not necessarily 
conflict with the primary purpose of Congress's hazardous waste man-
agement scheme, because prompt cleanup of hazardous wastes often 
helps prevent harm to public health and the environment by minimiz-
ing exposure to the wastes.129 Given this view of Congressional intent, 
one could read RCRA (b)(2)(B)'s provisions to prohibit RCRA (a)(1)(B) 
imminent and substantial endangerment suits that relate to ongoing 
CERCLA response actions.13o 
123 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b)(2)(B) and (a)(l)(B). 
124 See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1218 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994) (citizens' group claiming clean-up 
activities emitting dioxin and endangering local residents and local environment). 
125 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
126 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5) (providing purpose of RCRA). Such a suit would promote 
this goal by ensuring that any complaints about the adequacy of a cleanup, with regards to 
protection of public health and the environment, are addressed. 
127 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-6120; 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (providing goal of Congress's hazardous waste management 
scheme). Such a suit would promote this goal by ensuring that any complaints about the 
adequacy of a cleanup, with regards to protection of public health and the environment, are 
addressed. 
128 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
129 See Cabot Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D.Pa. 
1988) (recognizing that prompt cleanups are compatible with Congress's goal of protecting public 
health and the environment). 
130 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). If one accepts that Congress's primary goal 
behind CERCLA section 113(h) was to ensure prompt cleanups of hazardous wastes so as to 
reduce exposure to the wastes, one could carry that intent over into a reading of RCRA 
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Moreover, the plain language of RCRA (b)(2)(B) distinguishes be-
tween CERCLA response actions conducted by the EPA itself under 
CERCLA section 104, and those response actions conducted by a 
responsible party pursuant to an administrative order under CER-
CLA section 106.131 Where a cleanup is conducted pursuant to an 
administrative order under CERCLA section 106, RCRA (b)(2)(B) 
prohibits RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions "only as to the scope and duration 
of the administrative order referred to."132 The case of Fishel v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., addressed this issue.l33 In Fishel, the plaintiffs 
alleged that release of hazardous wastes was adversely affecting their 
drinking water.l34 The defendant argued that RCRA (b)(2)(B) barred 
plaintiffs' claim because there was already an ongoing CERCLA cleanup 
at the site in question.135 The District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, however, held that RCRA (b)(2)(B) did not bar plain-
tiffs' suit, because the scope of the administrative order, which related 
to the ongoing CERCLA cleanup, addressed only surface contamina-
tion.136 Because the subject matter of the plaintiffs suit was subsur-
face contamination, the court found that the plain language of RCRA 
(b)(2)(B) did not bar the plaintiffs' suit.137 
The Fishel case stands for the proposition that parties may main-
tain an action under RCRA (a)(l)(B) in the face of a cleanup under 
CERCLA section 106.138 This is so even if one finds that RCRA 
(b)(2)(B) bars RCRA (a)(l)(B) actions that conflict with an ongoing 
cleanup under CERCLA section 104.139 One may reasonably conclude 
(b)(2)(B). Such a reading would interpret RCRA (b)(2)(B) to mean that no actions could be 
brought until at least a first crack had been made at cleaning up the hazardous wastes. One 
should question, however, the propriety of importing Congressional intent expressed in legisla-
tive history that dealt explicitly with CERCLA section 113(h) to an interpretation of RCRA's 
provisions. 
131 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(i)-{iv). The policy behind this distinction may be that 
courts should give deference to EPA's environmental expertise and assume that the EPA will 
not act in a way that would threaten the environment, see, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973), whereas responsible parties carrying out 
an administrative order may need the additional oversight of the public in order to insure that 
the environment is not harmed by cleanup activities. See United States v. Colorado 990 F.2d 
1565, 1573 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). 
132 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
133 See Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (M.D. Pa. 1985). 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1577-578 (10th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 922 (1994) (recognizing distinction between (a)(1)(A) and (a)(l)(B) suits and allowing an 
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that EPA-conducted cleanups would bar a RCRA citizen suit while 
cleanups conducted by responsible parties would not, because Con-
gress and courts often defer to the EPA's "environmental expertise" 
in order to guard against harm to the environment.l40 Thus, it would 
be more likely that cleanups conducted by the EPA, as opposed to 
cleanups conducted by private parties, would be given the benefit of 
the doubt that they were protecting public health and the environ-
ment. 
Even though Congress distinguishes between section 104 and sec-
tion 106 response actions, one may conclude that RCRA (b)(2)(B) also 
bars suits that allege that CERCLA section 106 clean-up activities 
themselves are creating an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment.l4l This is because any clean-up activities, 
even if they create their own pollution, are arguably within the scope 
of an administrative order relating to the cleanup of a hazardous 
waste site. 142 In North Shore Gas, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that any measure involved in a clean-up action 
"reasonably related to" the cleanup is part of the remedial action, and, 
thus, is within the scope of the relevant administrative order.l43 Thus, 
courts can reasonably find that pollution that results from clean-up 
activities is within the scope of an administrative order if the pollution 
relates closely to the functioning of the clean-up plan.144 
It is true that litigation delays might be avoided if courts interpret 
RCRA (b)(2)(B) to bar citizens suits in the face of an ongoing CER-
CLA cleanup, but barring such suits might allow clean-up activities 
that harm public health and the environment to go unchecked.145 Such 
an interpretation of RCRA (b)(2)(B)'s provisions could have conse-
(a)(l)(A) action). Although this case is not directly on point, it does provide an example of a 
court finding that the absence of language in one instance and the inclusion of language in 
another similar section was sufficient to indicate that the sections were to be treated differently. 
See id. 
140 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
141 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution 
Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1215, 1218 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994) 
(plaintiffs bringing suit alleging cleanup under CERCLA section 106 creating imminent and 
substantial endangerment to public health and the environment). 
142 See North Shore Gas CO. V. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 
1991) (declaring any action involved in cleanup to be within the scope of administrative order). 
143 [d. 
144 See id. 
145 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218; North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1245. If the facts 
of this case as alleged by the plaintiffs are true, then this case presents a situation where a 
court's barring of a RCRA citizen suit would allow a CERCLA cleanup to harm public health 
and the environment. [d. 
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quences that run counter to the expressed purpose behind Congress's 
hazardous waste management scheme, protection of public health and 
the environment.l46 
2. RCRA's Citizen Suit meets CERCLA's Jurisdictional Bar 
Some EPA-approved CERCLA cleanups may be well-intentioned, 
but, nevertheless, may fail to meet RCRA's standards for hazardous 
waste disposal, or may actually create residual harms.147 Citizens who 
live near a clean-up action that fails to meet RCRA's standards, or 
allegedly endangers health or the environment, may turn to courts to 
ensure that the cleanup does not harm their health or the local envi-
ronment.148 RCRA's citizen suit provision offers concerned citizens a 
vehicle to bring their concerns to the attention of a court.149 
It is conceivable that suits brought under RCRA's citizen suit pro-
visions, which seek to enforce RCRA's requirements or abate an 
imminent and substantial endangerment at a CERCLA clean-up site, 
would run up against CERCLA's jurisdictional bar.l50 Section 113(h) 
of CERCLA bars any "challenges" to a CERCLA response action; 
though section 113(h)(4) excepts citizen suits from this bar, it post-
pones the right to bring citizen suits until completion of a response 
action.151 Plaintiffs have tried to bring citizen suits alleging violations 
of statutes besides RCRA and CERCLA, and all have been unable to 
overcome CERCLA's jurisdictional bar of section 113(h).152 N everthe-
less, there are compelling reasons to reach a different conclusion 
146 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a)(4), (5) (setting forth the goals behind RCRA, to protect 
public health and the environment from hazardous wastes); H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, 
at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119~120 (delineating Congress's purpose behind 
CERCLA of protecting public health and the environment from hazardous wastes). 
147 An example of such a situation is where the incineration of contaminated soil at a hazardous 
waste site emits dioxin into the surrounding air. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 
supra note 1 (describing potential harms to public health and the environment from use of 
incineration to destroy wastes); see also Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218. 
148 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218 (citizens' group turning to court to ensure that 
CERCLA cleanup does not harm their health or local environment); see also infra notes 224-47 
and accompanying text. 
149 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
150 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218; United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 
1576--77 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). 
151 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). 
152 See North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1991); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1991); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 
F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Healy supra note 21, at 56--82 (discussing possibility for 
judicial review of CERCLA liability under other statutory schemes). 
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about the ability to overcome CERCLA section 113(h)'s jurisdictional 
bar in an action brought under RCRNs citizen suit provision.l53 
There is reason to believe that citizen suits brought under RCRA 
will have more success against CERCLNs jurisdictional bar than 
suits brought under other statutory provisions. The citizen suits that 
parties have brought during a CERCLA response, and which have 
failed as a result, were brought under provisions that did not spe-
cifically address the issue of when such suits could be maintained in 
the face of a CERCLA response.154 In Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 
the plaintiff brought an action to remove a piece of property from the 
National Priorities Listl55 on the grounds that the property was eligi-
ble for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places.156 The 
plaintiff argued that the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 
authorized the court to review the case and grant relief as appropriate 
despite CERCLA clean-up activities at the site.157 In reviewing the 
case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that even 
though it could hear the plaintiff's claim under the NHPA, section 
113(h) of CERCLA barred federal courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff's claim.158 It is important to note that the NHPA 
differs from RCRA in that the NHPA does not address the issue of 
whether and when a party may maintain a citizen suit in the face of 
a CERCLA cleanup.l59 
Similarly, in Schalk v. Reilly, plaintiffs brought a citizen suit that 
sought to compel the EPA to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), in 
conjunction with actions taken at a CERCLA site.160 The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first found that it could review NEPA 
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A).161 Then, how-
ever, the court dismissed the case as barred by the plain language of 
153 See United States v. Colorado 990 F.2d 1565, 1577-78 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 922. (1994) (allowing state of Colorado to maintain suit under RCRA's citizen suit provision 
despite CERCLA section 113(h)'s jurisdictional bar). 
154 See Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1013 (brought under NHPA); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097 
(brought under NEPA). 
155 The National Priorities List lists the hazardous waste release sites which pose the greatest 
risk to public health and the environment. CERCLA, § 9605(c). 
156 See Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1013. 
157 See id. at 1015. 
158 See id. at 1022. 
159 See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470(x)(6) (1988). There is 
no provision in the NHPA that corresponds to RCRA's section 6972(b) delineating when citizen 
suits may be maintained in the face of a CERCLA cleanup. 
160 See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1990). 
161Id. 
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CERCLA section 113(h), because the plaintiffs' action constituted a 
"challenge" to a CERCLA response.162 
As with Boarhead Corp., it is important to note that neither NEPA 
nor the APA address the issue of whether and when a party may 
maintain an action in the face of a CERCLA response.l63 RCRA's 
citizen suit provision, on the other hand, does specifically address the 
issue of whether and when actions are barred in the face of a CER-
CLA response.164 Because RCRA's citizen suit provision does address 
this issue, it is an indication that Congress did not intend CERCLA 
section 113(h) to bar a RCRA citizen suit when RCRA's provisions 
specifically allow parties to bring suits in the face of CERCLA clean-
UpS.165 To hold that CERCLA section 113(h) bars RCRA citizen suits 
would be to find that Congress meant to implicitly repeal a right of 
action conferred by RCRA. As a general rule, courts are reluctant to 
do this.166 
Another characteristic that distinguishes cases that courts found to 
be barred by CERCLA section 113(h) from cases involving RCRA 
citizen suits is that parties did not bring the former suits under 
provisions which related directly to protection of public health and 
the environment from hazardous waste.167 This is an important dis-
tinction, because protection of public health and the environment from 
162 See id. at 1097. 
163 See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988); Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501--596 (1988). There is not provision in either NEPA or the APA 
that corresponds to RCRA's section 6972(b) delineating when parties may maintain a citizen 
suit in the face of a CERCLA cleanup. 
164 See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
165 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1577--578 (10th 
Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). 
166 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575. The Tenth Circuit gave a brief summary 
of general rules of statutory construction in its decision in United States v. Colorado. Id. The 
court stated that, 
Id. 
When Congress has enacted two statutes which appear to conflict, we must attempt 
to construe their provisions harmoniously .... Even when a later enacted statute is 
not entirely harmonious with an earlier one, we are reluctant to find repeal by impli-
cation unless the text or legislative history of the later statute shows that Congress 
intended to repeal the earlier statute and simply failed to do so expressly. 
In outlining these rules, the Tenth Circuit cited to cases which had been decided by the 
Supreme Court. Id. 
167 See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1013 (3d Cir. 1991) (responsible party citizen 
suit seeking to compel EPA to consider the NHPA at CERCLA site); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 
1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (citizen suit seeking to compel preparation of environmental impact 
statement prior to CERCLA cleanup, and alternatively seeking review of EPA's determinations 
under the APA). 
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hazardous wastes is central to both RCRA and CERCLA.I68 The 
statute at issue in Boarhead Corp. was the NHPA, which addresses 
preservation of historic landmarks rather than protection of health.l69 
Similarly, while the statute involved in Schalk, NEPA, deals broadly 
with environmental protection, it does not deal directly with protec-
tion of public health and the environment from hazardous wastes, and 
it is not part of Congress's hazardous waste management scheme.170 
Unlike the statutes involved in Boarhead Corp. and Schalk, RCRA's 
performance standards are specifically designed to protect public health 
and the environment from hazardous wastes.l7l An action brought under 
RCRA's citizen suit provision, which seeks either to enforce RCRA's 
requirements or to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment, 
necessarily furthers protection of public health and the environment.l72 
This is the primary goal of CERCLAY3 In addition, Congress passed 
CERCLA as an amendment to RCRA in order to supplement RCRA's 
"prospective" hazardous waste management scheme.174 Thus, there is 
a generic, statutory difference between citizen suits brought under 
RCRA and those brought under other statutes.175 It is important to 
understand this difference in order to resolve discrepancies over Con-
gressional intent in the interpretation of CERCLA section 113(h)'s 
jurisdictional bar so that it does not defeat the primary goal of CER-
CLA and Congress's hazardous waste management scheme, protec-
tion of public health and the environment. 
B. The Case Law: A Split in the Circuits 
The combined language of CERCLA and RCRA does not explicitly 
address whether CERCLA's section 113(h) bars citizen suits under 
RCRA (a)(1)(A) and (a)(l)(B) when the RCRA citizen suits involve 
168 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
169 See Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1015; National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,16 U.S.C. 
§§ 470-4 70(x)(6) (1988). 
170 See Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1094; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-437Od 
(1988). 
171 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
172 See RCRA, 42 U .S.C. § 6972(a). An action brought under (a)(l)(B), to abate an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment, necessarily seeks to protect 
public health or the environment whereas an action under (a)(l)(A), to enforce RCRA's require-
ments, seeks to protect public health and the environment by virtue of the fact that RCRA's 
requirements are promulgated to serve that very purpose. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924. 
173 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text. 
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an EPA-approved CERCLA cleanup.176 Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth CircuiV77 and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit have addressed this issue.178 These two courts have 
split on the issue of whether CERCLA section 113(h) bars judicial 
review of citizen suits brought under RCRA.179 
1. United States v. Colorado: No Jurisdictional Bar 
In United States v. Colorado, the State of Colorado sought to en-
force its RCRA-authorized hazardous waste management laws against 
the United States Army in the Army's cleanup of the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal.I80 The Army was conducting a cleanup to remedy the many 
tons of hazardous wastes that it had disposed of at the arsenal.I8I The 
EPA was overseeing the Army's clean-up activities to ensure compli-
ance with federal hazardous waste laws.182 Colorado brought its action 
to enforce RCRA-approved state hazardous waste laws pursuant to 
RCRA's (a)(1)(A) citizen suit provision which allows citizens to bring 
a suit to enforce RCRA's requirements.183 The Army argued that 
CERCLA section 113(h) barred judicial review of any challenges to 
a CERCLA response action prior to completion of the response ac-
tion.184 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, decided 
that CERCLA section 113(h) did not bar Colorado's RCRA (a)(l)(A) 
enforcement action, and the court allowed Colorado to enforce its 
compliance order.l85 
The Tenth Circuit examined the problem as one of statutory con-
struction.186 In deciding the case, the Tenth Circuit relied on a close 
scrutiny of the plain language and structure of CERCLA and RCRA 
in light of Congress's intention to create a hazardous waste manage-
ment scheme to remedy the nation's hazardous waste problem.l87 The 
176 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)-(b). 
177 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1574 (10th Cir. 1993), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
922 (1994). 
178 See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1216 (8th Cir. 1993), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
179 See id. 
100 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571--572. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. Since Colorado's hazardous waste laws were approved by the EPA under RCRA, the 
state laws had the same force as regulations promulgated pursuant to RCRA. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 1578. 
I&; See id. at 1575. 
187 See id. at 1575--578. 
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court concluded that Congress did not implicitly repeal RCRXs citi-
zen suit provision by the inclusion of section 113(h) in CERCLXs 1986 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act amendments.l88 The 
court proceeded to interpret both CERCLA section 113(h) and RCRA 
(a)(1)(A) in light of Congress's overall hazardous waste management 
scheme.189 
The court first noted that Congress did not intend CERCLA to 
change the effect of any other federal or state law, and thus compli-
ance with CERCLA should not alleviate the Army's need to comply 
with the requirements of RCRA which Colorado sought to enforce.1OO 
The court went on to note that, for purposes of CERCLA section 
113(h), Congress contemplated a differentiation between suits by po-
tentially responsible parties which sought to delay a CERCLA re-
sponse, and "legitimate" citizen suits which sought to further the 
protection of public health and the environment.191 As Colorado's en-
forcement action was not a challenge by a responsible party, the court 
found that Colorado's action was not one which Congress intended to 
bar from review prior to completion of a CERCLA response.l92 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately decided that Colorado's effort to ap-
ply its hazardous waste management laws to the Army's CERCLA 
cleanup was not a "challenge" to a CERCLA response within the 
meaning of section 113(h).193 The court reached this decision because 
it found that Congress, in enacting CERCLA section 113(h), intended 
to prevent responsible parties from filing "dilatory" lawsuits which 
delayed or prevented CERCLA cleanups.l94 As Colorado's lawsuit 
merely sought to ensure that the cleanup complied with EPA-author-
ized state laws, and did not seek to delay or prevent the cleanup, the 
court concluded that Colorado's action did not fall within the meaning 
188 Congress added CERCLA section 113(h) in an effort to revamp CERCLA in 1986 with the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 
266--67, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2940-2942. 
189 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575. 
190 See id. CERCLA provides that, "[n]othing in [CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way 
the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, including common 
law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants." 
CERCLA, § 9652(d). 
191 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577. The court also found that there was no 
difference between a state and a person for purposes of both 113(h) and (a)(l)(A). See id. at 1576, 
1578. 
192 See id. at 1577. 
193 See id. at 1576--577. 
194 See id. at 1576. Congress did not want potentially responsible parties to be able to bring 
litigation challenging a response action that would have the effect of delaying a response. See 
H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941. 
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of "challenge" that Congress had contemplated in enacting CERCLA 
section 113(h).195 
The Tenth Circuit also relied on the language of RCRA's citizen suit 
provision to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend for 
CERCLA section 113(h) to bar RCRA (a)(l)(A) actions in the face 
of a CERCLA response. 196 The court noted the difference between 
RCRA (a)(l)(A) and RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions in the "Actions Prohib-
ited" section of RCRA's citizens' suit provision.l97 The court decided 
that RCRA section 6972(b),s prohibition of RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions 
prior to the completion of a CERCLA response, and the lack of a 
corresponding prohibition for RCRA (a)(l)(A) actions, evidenced Con-
gress's intent not to prohibit RCRA (a)(l)(A) actions during a CER-
CLA response.19S 
The theme that runs throughout the Tenth Circuit's decision is the 
practical notion that it makes little sense, in light of Congress's overall 
hazardous waste management scheme, to allow a CERCLA response 
to proceed in disregard of RCRA's requirements. l99 Because Congress 
intended RCRA and CERCLA to work together to remedy the na-
tion's hazardous waste problems,2°O the court concluded that it should 
not implicitly repeal the right of action conferred by RCRA which 
allowed a citizen suit action to enforce RCRA's requirements at a 
CERCLA cleanup.201 
2. Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control 
and Ecology: Jurisdictional Bar 
The other case that addresses the question of whether CERCLA 
section 113(h) bars an action under RCRA (a)(l)(A) is Arkansas Peace 
Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology.202 In Arkan-
sas Peace Ctr., neighbors of a CERCLA response site brought an 
action that sought to enjoin the incineration of hazardous wastes at 
an abandoned herbicide and pesticide production site.203 The hazard-
195 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576-77. 
196 See id. at 1577-78. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. at 1578; see also supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
199 See id. at 1575--578. 
200 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
202 Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1216-18 (8th Cir. 1993), eert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
2m [d. at 1213-15. 
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ous waste to be incinerated contained dioxin, which is one of the most 
toxic and carcinogenic compounds known to humans.204 
The plaintiffs sued under both RCRA (a)(1)(A), seeking to enforce 
RCRA's performance standards to the cleanup, and RCRA (a)(1)(B), 
seeking to abate the alleged imminent and substantial endangerment 
to public health and the environment posed by the release of dioxin 
into the air via the incinerator.205 The suit under RCRA (a)(1)(A) 
sought to enforce compliance with a RCRA promulgated regulation 
that required incinerators to operate at a "destruction and removal 
efficiency" of 99.9999% for dioxin.206 The district court below had found 
that the defendants could not demonstrate that the incinerator to be 
used at the site was capable of achieving the RCRA-required destruc-
tion and removal efficiency, and the court had issued a preliminary 
injunction.207 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, after first 
upholding the injunction, dismissed the appeal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.20B The court found that CERCLA section 113(h) 
barred the plaintiff's suit under RCRA (a)(1)(A), because the suit was 
a "challenge" under CERCLA section 113(h).209 
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied mainly on com-
parisons of Arkansas Peace Ctr. with cases which addressed the 
question of whether CERCLA section 113(h) barred judicial review 
prior to completion of a CERCLA response.210 The Eighth Circuit 
compared the case to Schalk v. Reilly.211 Schalk involved a suit brought 
under NEPA that sought to compel the EPA to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) regarding the clean-up method it had 
selected.212 The Eighth Circuit also compared Arkansas Peace Ctr. to 
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson.213 Boarhead Corp. was brought under 
the NHPA.214 The Eighth Circuit cited Schalk and Boarhead Corp. 
for the proposition that Congress intended CERCLA section 113(h) 
204 See id. at 1213-214. Dioxin is an ultrahazardous waste, for which there may be no safe level 
of exposure, it is alleged to cause cancer as well as reproductive mutations. See GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, supra note 1, at 9. 
205 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1217-1218. 
206 See id. at 1214; 40 C.F.R. § 264.343(a)(2) (1992). 
207 Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1215 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'g 992 F.2d 145 (8th Cir 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 1215-16. 
210 See id. at 1217-18. 
211 See id.; Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1990). 
212 Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1094. 
213 See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 
1217 (8th Cir. 1993); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991). 
214 Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1015. 
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to bar any action that delayed a CERCLA cleanup.215 The Eighth 
Circuit also relied on North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to support its conclusion that CERCLA section 113(h) 
barred judicial review until the completion of a CERCLA cleanup.216 
North Shore Gas appeared to be very similar to Arkansas Peace Ctr. 
in that it had been brought in part under RCRA.217 North Shore Gas 
was not entirely similar, however, because it involved a suit brought 
by potentially responsible parties that dealt with issues of liability 
allocation.218 In CERCLA section 113(h)'s legislative history, Con-
gress urged courts to differentiate between such a suit by potentially 
responsible parties and "legitimate" citizen suits.219 
The plaintiffs in Arkansas Peace Ctr. also tried to bring a suit under 
RCRA (a)(1)(B).220 This part of the suit alleged that the emission of 
any dioxin from the incinerator into the environment was an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to public health and the environ-
ment.221 As dioxin is one of the most potent toxins and carcinogens 
known, even a minuscule amount released into the atmosphere can 
be lethal.222 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit found the language of 
RCRA's "Actions Prohibited" section, section 6972(b), expressly barred 
this cause of action.223 
215 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1217. 
216 See id.; North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th 
Cir.1991). 
217 The two cases appeared to be similar, because they were both brought under provisions of 
RCRA. See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1217; North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1241 (seeking 
to compel EPA cleanup to obtain a RCRA permit). 
218 North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1245. 
219 See supra notes 79--85 and accompanying text 
2ID Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218. 
221 See id. The plaintiff's complaint stated that the proposed incineration would 
result in toxic and hazardous chemicals released into the air (both unburned feed 
chemicals and chemical by-products of incomplete combustion) including polychlori-
nated dibenzo-p-dioxins and polychlorinated dibenzofurans, and the pesticides 2,4-D 
and 2,4,5-T and their derivatives and combustion by-products, which will pose serious 
risk of harm (cancer, immune and reproductive system damage and other effects) to 
human health and the environment. 
Plaintiffs complaint at 3, Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and 
Ecology, 23 ELR 20807 (E.D.Ark), aff'd 992 F.2d 145 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
222 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, supra note 1, at 9, 24. 
223 See Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218. 
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III. A CASE STUDY: NEW BEDFORD HARBOR AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
How RCRA CITIZEN SUITS HELP TO FURTHER THE GOALS OF 
CONGRESS'S HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SCHEME 
The CERCLA cleanup of New Bedford Harbor provides a vivid 
example of how the interpretation of CERCLA section 113(h) to allow 
"legitimate" citizen suits under RCRA can ultimately further CER-
CLA's goal of protecting public health and the environment from 
hazardous wastes. New Bedford Harbor, in New Bedford, Massachu-
setts, has been one of the most polluted harbors in the world since the 
1970s.224 The sediments in the harbor are laden with PCBs and heavy 
metals.225 It was not until 1982, however, that the EPA declared the 
harbor a Superfund site, and the CERCLA clean-up process began.226 
In 1986, the EPA reached a "cash out" settlement agreement with 
the two primary responsible parties, Aerovox and Cornell-Dubilier.2Z7 
This settlement agreement allowed the EPA to pursue a cleanup 
itself, under CERCLA section 104.226 In 1980, eight years after the 
EPA declared the harbor a Superfund site, the EPA put forth a record 
of decision (ROD) which named incineration as the best technology to 
clean up the harbor.229 
CERCLA requires that the EPA consult with a community work-
ing group when choosing a response alternative.230 The EPA worked 
with such a group in New Bedford.231 Nevertheless, when the commu-
nity learned that the EPA had chosen incineration for the cleanup, 
some members of the community became concerned because of re-
224 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RECORD OF DECISION SUMMARY, NEW BED-
FORD HARBORiHOT SPOT OPERABLE UNIT 1-4 (April 1990); Interview with William Shutkin, 
Esq., Alternatives for Community and Environment, in Newton, MA (February 4, 1994). 
225 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
226 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 224, at 3; Interview with William 
Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
227 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. A "cash out" settlement is where 
the responsible parties concede their liability for the clean-up costs. [d. 
228 [d.; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
229 The process of incineration involves dredging the contaminated sediments from the bottom 
of the harbor and incinerating them to remove the contaminants. See ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, supra note 224, at 27; interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
A record of decision is essentially a compilation of the history of the decision-making process 
at the CERCLA site. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 224. 
280 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (requiring availability of public participation); ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 224, at 6-7. 
231 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 224, at 6-7; interview with Wil-
liam Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
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ports that incineration of PCBs can result in the release of dioxin.232 
When the EPA released the ROD, and made known the location of 
the incineration site, neighbors of the site formed a coalition, called 
"Hands Across the River."233 The coalition intended to block the use 
of incineration to clean up the harbor.234 By 1993, other citizen groups 
from communities located downwind of the incineration site had joined 
Hands Across the River.235 
According to scientific evidence gathered during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the fears of these citizen groups were valid.236 The scien-
tific evidence suggested that incineration was not the best alternative 
for cleaning up hazardous wastes.237 In fact, the evidence showed that 
the emission of dioxin into the atmosphere from incineration could 
actually be more hazardous to human health than the alternative of 
leaving the hazardous wastes in place.238 This information greatly 
concerned the citizens who lived near the New Bedford Harbor incin-
eration site, because they knew that dioxin would be released when 
the harbor sediments, containing PCBs, were incinerated.239 
Hands Across the River retained the legal services of Alternatives 
for Community and Environment ("ACE") in the fall of 1993.240 ACE, 
working in conjunction with members of the Conservation Research 
Group at Boston College Law School, filed a notice of intent to sue 
with the EPA.241 In addition to other claims, the notice included a 
claim under RCRA (a)(1)(B) alleging that the incineration of PCBs 
and emission of dioxin would create an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to public health and the environment near and down-
wind of the incineration site.242 As a result of this notice, ACE was 
successful in persuading the EPA to enter into mediation with Hands 
Across the River and, subsequently, the EPA has withdrawn incin-
232 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
233 [d. 
234 [d. 
235 [d. 
236 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, supra note 1, at 9. 
237 See id. at 2 
238 See id. at 9, 12. The risk of death from food chain accumulation as a result of dioxin 
emissions from incineration is known to be 1,000-10,000 times greater than the risk from 
inhalation of ambient dioxin. [d. at 2. 
239 See id.; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 224, at 1-2; interview with 
William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
240 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
241 [d. 
242 Notice of intent to sue the Environmental Protection Agency, from Alternatives for Com-
munityand Environment, Newton, MA (October, 1993) (on file with author); interview with 
William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
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eration as an alternative for cleaning up the harbor.243 As soon as the 
EPA withdrew incineration as a cleanup alternative, Hands Across 
the River became a partner with the EPA in exploring constructive 
alternatives for cleaning up New Bedford Harbor.244 
Ultimately, Hands Across the River was successful in convincing 
the EPA that incineration does not protect public health and the 
environment and, therefore, does not further the purpose behind 
CERCLA.245 Even though the legal action by the citizen group had 
the effect of delaying the cleanup, the action was not brought by 
a responsible party and was not intended to delay or prevent the 
cleanup, which was precisely what Congress sought to avoid by en-
acting CERCLA section 113(h).246 As a result of the citizen group's 
ability to threaten a lawsuit, the ultimate remediation of the New 
Bedford Harbor will result in a cleanup that truly protects public 
health and the environment.247 
This case study illustrates why courts should not read CERCLA 
section 113(h) to bar a citizen suit action under RCRA's citizen suit 
provisions. This case is a good example of the type248 of situation 
where protection of public health and the environment would be 
furthered if citizen groups had RCRA's citizen suit provision in their 
arsenal to combat CERCLA cleanups that could create a harm worse 
than the one being rerriedied.249 If the EPA knows that a RCRA citizen 
suit will not be barred by CERCLA section 113(h), the Agency may 
243 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
244 [d. 
245 [d. 
246 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
247 Interview with William Shutkin, Esq., supra note 224. 
248 [d. Hands Across the River's success in persuading the EPA to enter into negotiations was 
probably due more to a state law claim than to a claim under RCRA (a)(I)(B). The EPA may 
be sued for not fulfilling a mandatory requirement if it does not consider state law that is 
Applicable, Relative, and Appropriate [Requirements] ("ARARs"). See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9659(a)(1), 9613(h). Attorneys involved in the case attribute their success largely to their 
ARARs claim. Interview with William Shutkin, Esq. and Charles Lord, Esq., Alternatives for 
Community and Environment, in Newton, MA (April 6, 1994). Section 113(h) provides that "No 
Federal court shall have jurisdiction ... other than ... under State law which is applicable or 
relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title .... " CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
The EPA has avoided ARARs claims by arguing that interim measures at a CERCLA cleanup 
need not comply with all ARARs as long as the overall cleanup complies. Interview with William 
Shutkin, Esq. and Charles Lord, Esq., Alternatives for Community and Environment, in New-
ton, MA (April 6, 1994). It should also be noted, however, that a full discussion of ARARs is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
249 See Government Accountability Project and Public Citizen Litigation Group, Brief for writ 
of Certiorari to the Supreme Court passim, Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution 
Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
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be quick to enter into negotiations and work with communities to 
remedy hazardous waste problems rather than fight in court over a 
CERCLA response such as incineration that might not adequately 
protect public health and the environment. The New Bedford experi-
ence demonstrates that by reading CERCLA section 113(h) to allow 
citizen suits under RCRA it is possible to harmonize Congress's goal 
for its hazardous waste management scheme, protection of public 
health and the environment, with its goal for CERCLA section 113(h), 
preventing responsible parties from delaying or preventing clean-
UpS.250 
IV. WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT INTERPRET CERCLNs 
JURISDICTIONAL BAR TO PROHIBIT RCRA CITIZENS' SUITS 
RCRA, on its face, may be read to reach the conclusion that parties 
may bring RCRA citizen suit actions prior to the completion of a 
CERCLA response.251 In addition, there is some evidence that Con-
gress intended courts to read CERCLA section 113(h) to allow for 
review of "legitimate" citizen suits prior to completion of a CERCLA 
cleanup.252 Reading RCRA and CERCLA in this way furthers Con-
gress's overall goal of its hazardous waste management scheme, pro-
tection of public health and the environment.253 In addition, cases 
where courts have read CERCLA section 113(h) to bar citizen suits 
relating to a CERCLA cleanup are distinguishable from situations 
where citizen suits are brought under RCRA.254 
Where an action is brought under one of RCRNs citizen suit pro-
visions, RCRNs provisions for prohibition of review must be recon-
ciled with CERCLNs section 113(h).255 RCRNs "Actions Prohibited" 
provision plainly, and expressly, contemplates the issue of whether 
250 See RCRA, §§ 6902(a)(4), (5); H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941; H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119. 
251 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. 
252 See 132 CONGo REC. H9575, H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Representatives 
Florio and Roe); 132 CONGo REC. Sl4818, Sl4898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senators 
Stafford and Mitchell). But see 132 CONGo REC. S 14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of 
Senator Thurmond). 
253 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
254 See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1015 (3d Cir. 1991) (responsible party citizen 
suit brought under the NHPA); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (citizen 
suit seeking to compel preparation of environmental impact statement under NEPA and to 
review EPA's determinations under the APA). 
255 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
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and when a party may maintain a citizen suit in the face of a CERCLA 
response.256 While the "Actions Prohibited" provision expressly bars 
RCRA (a)(1)(B) actions in the face of a CERCLA response, there is 
no corresponding prohibition for RCRA (a)(1)(A) actions.257 This lan-
guage indicates Congress's intent that a party may maintain an en-
forcement action under RCRA (a)(1)(A) even if the EPA is engaged 
in a CERCLA response.258 In addition, it is possible to read the lan-
guage of RCRA's "Actions Prohibited" provision to allow a party to 
maintain a RCRA (a)(1)(B) action in the face of a CERCLA response 
if the EPA is not addressing the exact same activities that are alleged 
to be creating the imminent and substantial endangerment.259 
The question remains, however, whether Congress intended an 
action under RCRA's citizen suit provision to be a "challenge" under 
CERCLA section 113(h), so as to implicitly repeal the right to bring 
a citizen suit under RCRA in the face of a CERCLA response. It is 
doubtful that Congress so intended. Reading CERCLA section 113(h) 
to bar RCRA citizen suits that allege that a CERCLA cleanup is 
harming health or the environment would not serve the purposes 
behind Congress's hazardous waste management scheme.260 Even though 
CERCLA section 113(h) is a jurisdictional bar for many claims that 
involve a CERCLA cleanup, it is doubtful that CERCLA section 
113(h) should be interpreted in a way that creates irreparable harm.261 
Indeed, taken to its extreme, such a reading of CERCLA section 
256 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1577--578 (10th 
Cir. 1993), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 922 (1994). 
257 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578. 
258 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578. 
259 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B); Government Accountability Project and Public Citi-
zen Litigation Group, Brief for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court 23, Arkansas Peace 
Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1993), cen. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
260See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119-ti120 (setting forth Congress's purpose behind its hazardous waste management scheme 
which is, at least to the extent of RCRA and CERCLA, protection of public health and the 
environment from hazardous wastes). 
Also consider that Congress originally enacted CERCLA to supplement RCRA, and Con-
gress indicated that the two acts were intended to work together in remedying the nation's 
hazardous waste problem. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575-76 ; H.R. REP. No. 
1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-6120. Congress designed 
CERCLA to establish a level of attainment for how clean a hazardous waste site should be, and 
Congress designed RCRA to provide performance standards to ensure that the handling of 
hazardous wastes did not create risks to public health and the environment that would have to 
be cleaned up in the future. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621; RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(5). 
261 See North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1991) (Judge Posner expressing concern that courts could interpret CERCLA section 113(h) as 
a jurisdictional bar even in cases where to do so would lead to irreparable harm). 
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113(h) could lead to the prohibition of judicial review even if EPA's 
remedial plan included "tak[ing] the barrels of dioxin, truck[ing] them 
down to the Arkansas River and dump[ing] them in the river."262 
In enacting CERCLA section 113(h), Congress did not intend to 
eliminate judicial review altogether, but merely intended to postpone 
review of "legitimate" claims until a cleanup is completed.263 By post-
poning review of a suit alleging irreparable harm until it is moot, 
courts would eliminate any meaningful judicial review and would 
potentially allow irreparable harm to public health and the environ-
ment. Such a result is antithetical to Congress's goals.264 Congress 
designed CERCLA section 113(h) to secure prompt cleanup and thus 
limit exposure to hazardous wastes, to further the main goal of CER-
CLA.265 Indeed, prompt cleanup is often compatible with protection 
of public health and the environment.266 
In circumstances where a "legitimate" citizen suit can be brought 
under RCRA, however, delaying review for the purpose of securing 
prompt cleanup would be incompatible with protection of public health 
and the environment.267 Some members of Congress explicitly recog-
nized this possibility and called for courts to balance the equities of 
the situation and to interpret CERCLA section 113(h) to distinguish 
between suits brought by responsible parties and "legitimate" citizen 
suits.268 Distinguishing between suits brought by responsible parties 
and "legitimate" citizen suits would serve CERCLA section 113(h)'s 
purpose of preventing responsible parties from delaying cleanups 
with "dilatory" litigation. To so distinguish would also be consistent 
262 Government Accountability Project and Public Citizen Litigation Group, Brief for Writ of 
Certiorari to the Supreme Court 23, Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control 
and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1993), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
263 See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266-267, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2940-2942. 
264 See supra notes 33--,'38 and accompanying text. 
265 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
611~6120. 
266 See Cabot Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D.Pa. 
1988) (recognizing relationship between prompt cleanups of hazardous wastes and protection of 
public health and the environment). 
267 See, e.g., Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 
1212, 1213-215 (8th Cir. 1993), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994) (incineration of hazardous 
wastes resulting in release of dioxin into air). 
268 See 132 CONGo REC. H9575, H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Representatives 
Florio and Roe); 132 CONGo REC. SI4818, 814898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senators 
Stafford and Mitchell). But see 132 CONGo REC. S 14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of 
Senator Thurmond). 
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with the goal of protecting public health and the environment.269 It 
would be sadly ironic if courts were to read CERCLA section 113(h) 
in a way that defeated CERCLA's goal of protecting public health and 
the environment270 and RCRA's goal of minimizing the necessity of 
future cleanups.271 
The policy argument for reading CERCLA section 113(h) to further 
the goal of protecting public health and the environment is applicable 
to suits under both RCRA (a)(1)(A) and RCRA (a)(1)(B). Suits under 
RCRA (a)(1)(B) explicitly address protection of public health and the 
environment;272 suits under RCRA (a)(1)(A) implicitly address health 
and environmental protection issues, as the requirements that they 
seek to enforce are designed to protect public health and the environ-
ment.273 
Understanding that RCRA and CERCLA make up Congress's haz-
ardous waste management scheme also offers a compelling reason not 
to read CERCLA section 113(h) as a bar to citizen suits under RCRA 
in the face of an ongoing CERCLA response.274 Congress originally 
enacted CERCLA to supplement RCRA in remedying the nation's 
hazardous waste problem, and Congress indicated that it intended 
CERCLA to work with other hazardous waste laws in addressing this 
problem.275 Thus, a suit under RCRA is not necessarily a "challenge" 
to a CERCLA response, because a full consideration of RCRA's pro-
visions is necessary as part of a CERCLA response.276 
Even if one does not agree that RCRA (a)(1)(B) suits seeking to 
abate an imminent and substantial endangerment at a CERCLA 
cleanup site are not "challenges" to a CERCLA response, it is doubt-
ful that the same can be argued for RCRA (a)(1)(A) suits that seek to 
enforce the requirements of RCRA.277 In understanding why RCRA 
269 See H.R. REP No 253, supra note 54, at 266, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941; H.R. 
REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119--6120. 
270See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119--6120. 
271 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)(5). 
272 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Section (a)(l)(B) uses the words "[i]mminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to human health and the environment." [d. 
273 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A), 6922--6924. 
274 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
922 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119--6120. 
275 See CERCLA, §§ 9614(a), 9621(b)(1)(B); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575; H.R. 
REP. No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119--6120. 
276 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1)(B); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575-77. 
277 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A), (a)(l)(B). 
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(a)(l)(A) suits are not "challenges" to a CERCLA response, first 
consider that Congress originally enacted CERCLA to supplement 
RCRA.278 Next, recall CERCLA section 121(e), which states that 
CERCLA shall work with other federal hazardous waste laws to 
remedy the nation's hazardous waste problem.279 It is difficult to argue 
that an action that seeks to compel a CERCLA response to comply 
with the law, which is in fact part of the same legislative scheme as 
CERCLA, is a "challenge" to a CERCLA response.280 It is true that 
such a lawsuit could have the same delaying effect that Congress 
sought to avoid by enacting CERCLA section 113(h).281 Congress's 
real intent in enacting CERCLA section 113(h), however, was to 
prevent lawsuits that responsible parties brought with the intent to 
delay or prevent a CERCLA cleanup.282 Congress did not intend to 
prevent "legitimate" lawsuits that parties brought to ensure that a 
CERCLA cleanup was complying with the law.283 
Cases that have held claims under other statutes to be barred on 
the grounds that they were "challenges" to a CERCLA response 
are distinguishable from situations that involve citizen suits under 
RCRA.284 Both Boarhead Corp. and Schalk were brought under stat-
utes which were not part of Congress's hazardous waste management 
scheme.285 Boarhead Corp. was brought under the NHPA,286 and Schalk 
was brought under the AP A.287 In addition, neither the NHPA nor the 
APA has a citizen suit provision that specifically addresses when an 
action may be maintained in the face of a CERCLA cleanup.288 RCRA 
does specifically address this issue.289 Therefore, Boarhead Corp. and 
278 See H.R. REP No. 1016, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6119-6120. CERCLA was originally an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, better 
known today as RCRA. See id. 
279 See CERCLA, § 9621(e). 
200 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576-77. 
281 See id. (action not seeking to delay CERCLA cleanup). 
282 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
283 See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 54, at 266-267, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2941. 
284 See Boarhead Corp v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1015 (3d Cir. 1991); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 
1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1990). 
285 See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1570, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 922 (1994); Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1015; Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1094; H.R. REP. No. 1016, 
supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-6120. 
286 See Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1015. 
2f5l Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1094. Schalk also involved a claim brought under NEPA to compel the 
EPA to prepare an environmental impact statement before choosing a remedial action at a 
CERCLA site. Id. 
283 See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x6 (1988); Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-576 (1988). 
289 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 
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Schalk do not offer compelling reasons for reading the word "chal-
lenge" in CERCLA section 113(h) to bar a citizen suit under RCRA 
in the face of an ongoing CERCLA response.290 
v. CONCLUSION 
In light of the fact that RCRA and CERCLA are both part of 
Congress's hazardous waste management scheme, and were both in-
tended to protect public health and the environment, it defies good 
policy to read CERCLA section 113(h) in a way that bars actions 
under RCRA that seek to ensure that CERCLA cleanups are con-
ducted properly. Courts should fully examine the language, structure, 
and legislative history of Congress's hazardous waste management 
scheme, and then should read CERCLA section 113(h) in a way that 
avoids irreparable harm to public health and the environment. Read-
ing CERCLA section 113(h) to allow RCRA citizen suits will ulti-
mately have the effect of ensuring that we reach the best possible 
solutions to the nation's hazardous waste problem, and will ultimately 
help the EPA in its efforts to work with communities to clean up 
pollution in their environment. 
290 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), (b); Boarhead Carp., 923 F.2d at 1015; Schalk, 900 F.2d at 
1094. 
